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JOHN T. KIRBY
EGTi 5e tcata ttiv 5idvoiav xav)Ta, ooa xitio
xou Xoyot) 5ei TtapaaKEuaaGfivai. |i.epri 5e xoijtcov to xe ctTto-
5eiKvuvai Kai x6 ^tjeiv Kal x6 n6Qr\ napaaKCud^eiv (oiov
eXeov r\ (poPov r\ opyriv Kal oaa xoiauxa) Kai exi lieyeOoq 56bl
Kai niKp6xTixa(;. 5fiXov 5e oxi koi ev xoi(; Ttpdyiiaoiv dno
xcov auxcbv i5£a)v 6ei xP^^jGai oxav r\ kXeewa r\ 5£ivd r\
[lEyaXa r\ EiKOxa Setji napaoKevaC^tiv nXr\v xooovxov 5ia-
(pEpEi, 6x1 xd |iEv 6£i (pa{vEa0ai dvEu 5i5aaKaX{a(;, xd bk 5
EV xcbi Xoywi ujro xou Xeyovxoi; 7iapaaKEV)d^Ea9ai Kai Jtapd
xov X.6yov yiyvEoOai. (1456a36-b7)
bl-2 Kai Exi ^eyeGoc; Kai jiiKpoxriTac; seel. Else II 2 liiKpoxrixaq Parisinus
1741, Riccardianus 46: (a)|iiKp6xTixa Par. 2038 et alii recc. (sic et Arab.;
exiguitatem Margoliouth in uers. lat.) II 3 iSecov apographa Parisini 1741
(cf. 1450b34): £i6£(bv Par. 1741, Rice. 46 (cf. 1447a8, 1456a33) II 4 hir\\
recc: 6£i Rice. 46 {oportet Moerbeke in uers. lat.): 5' t\ Par. 1741
Perusal of the standard commentaries on the Poetics will show that the
difficulties of chapter 19, which is concerned with Sidvoia or "thought,"
have led to various interpretations. I have supplied a portion of the text,
from Kassel's 1965 Oxford edition, and furnished my own apparatus.
The passage is in essence an exploration of the contours of 5idvoia as
it applies in the composition of a tragedy. According to his habit, Aristotle
offers a dialectical SiaipeoK; of the topic of discussion, breaking it down
into component parts. In this instance, however, the very syntax makes
discernment of the 6ia{peoic; difficult; and more than one construction is
possible. Having cautioned my reader that there is no universally accepted
schematization of the train of thought here, I would like to offer my own
(Figure 1). From this diagram it will be clear that I understand 8idvoia as
operative on two levels within the performance of a play: in the words
spoken by the characters (vko to\) A-oyot)) and in their actions (ev xoic;
Tipdy^iaaiv).' The markers xd nev and xd 5e (b5) also reflect this major
' Cf. D. W. Lucas, Aristotle. Poetics (Oxford 1968) 196 (ad b2).
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distinction. What cannot be made clear in the diagram, however, is the fact
that over and above both the words and the actions of the dramatis personae
is the planning and craft of the playwright, from which the text indeed takes
its being. Aristotle conceives of this as well in terms of 8idvoia, as will
become clear from our examination of b3-4.
I would like to devote some scrutiny to several phrases in this most
difficult passage.
Kal exi ^eyeGoq Kal liiKpoTTjTaq: Else considers this phrase a
gloss that intrudes upon and destroys an essentially binary construction.^
Without it, he is free to redistribute to te dnoSEiKvuvai Kal to Xveiv and to
Kadr\ TtapaoKE-ud^eiv under the headings of ^.oyoq and TipdyiiaTa
respectively. This is a bold solution (as so many of Else's are) and provides
a synthetic understanding of our passage; but the adoption of such a solution
has repercussions further on, as we shall see.
TOt |iev . . . xa 6e: Having disposed of Kai bti \iiyeQoq Kal
[i\Kp6xr\xaq, Else seeks to make toc |iev and toc be refer to eA.eeivd r\ Seivd
and iiEyd^a ii eiKOTa respectively: £?ieeivd r\ 5eivd are to be "brought
home (to the spectator) without (explicit) exposition"; iieydA-a ii ekoTa are
to be "deliberately produced in speech."^ This, however, is unnecessarily
restrictive: it limits eXeewa r\ 6eivd to events, whereas things spoken may
also be £>.e£ivd r\ 5eivd;'* and it does not acknowledge that of course events
in the play, as well as points of argument, may be iieyd^a or eiKOTa.^ I
think rather that Ta Se should be read with the words that follow, i.e. Ta 6e
ev Tcbi ^oycoi, "things spoken" or "argumentation," as opposed to
Ttpdy^aTa, "things done." Else attempts to discredit this construction: he
assumes that Ta \ikv ev toic; 7ipdy|iaoiv must mean "verbal effects gotten
through action."^ But I find it more sensible to understand Ta }iev (sc. ev
Toiq Tipdyfiaoiv) as = Ta 7rpdy|iaTa themselves, which may be r\ ekeeiva r\
8eivd r\ [leyaXa r\ eiKOTa. The actual phrase ev xdlq Tipdyjiaoiv is used in
precisely the same way at 1454b6-7 as here at 1456b2; and it is important
to keep in mind that Aristotle's common term for the construction of the
H\j9o(; is aiL)v0eoi(; TtpayjidTcov, the "assembling of 7tpdy|iaTa." I have
schematized the 5ia{peai(; according to this understanding; but I question
the authenticity of the reading r\ |ieyd^a r\ eiKOTa, and to that I now turn.
Tl iieydXa t] eiKOta: ii eXeeivdri 8eivd (1456b3) make a pair here,
and correspond (under the heading of Ttpdy^aTa) to the mention of the
TcdOri at 1456a38-bl (under the heading of effects provided vnb xov X6yo\)).
^ G. F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge, MA 1957) 564 and nn. 7-9.
Kassel and other editors, however, print it without qualm.
^ Else (previous note) 561, 564—65.
* As the ancients also recognized; cf. e.g. Eur. Hipp. 498 cb 5eiva Xil,aa'.
^ Or even avayKaia—on which see below.
^ Else (above, note 2) 566 n. 12: "This is what has reduced the passage to the inanity we
spoke of earlier."
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5idvoia
vnb xov Xoyox) (a36-37) Kai ev xoiq Tipdy^aaiv (b2)
djioSeiicvuvai/
A.v)eiv
(a37-38)
\
TtdGri
TtapaaKEud^eiv
(a38)
I
I
lieyEGoq/
IxiKpoTTixa^
(bl-2)
eXeeivd/
5eivd
(b3)
|i.eydA,a/
eiKoxa
(b4)
eXeoc,
(bl)
(popoc;
(bl)
opyn
(bl)
oaa Toiauxa
(bl)
Figure 1
Vahlen in his Beitrdge delineates three [xepri of 5idvoia here: to xe
d7io8eiKvv)vai Kal to A,iL)eiv, to 7id9r| 7rapaoKe\)d^eiv, and iieyeGoc; Kai
liiKpoTriTaq. In coming to 1456b3-4, he seeks to preserve this tripartite
concept, and holds that r\ e^eeivd r\ 8eivd corresponds to to 7id6ri
TiapaoKE'ud^eiv, jieyd^ia to jieyeGoq Kai iiiKpoTtiTac;, and eiKOTa to to t£
ocTioSeiKvuvai Kai to XxiZwP This provides a neat responsion, but it
requires us to accept that ^eYdA,a and eiKOTa are each being used as a kind
of shorthand for the longer phrases.^ In the interest of such a balance, I
would have expected a simple KaBriTiKot (or the equivalent) instead of the
explicit pair r\ eXeEiva r\ 5eivd in b3, which demands to be balanced with
the pair t\ iieyd^a r\ eiKOTa as another dyad.
What seems unnatural is the pair iieyd^ia/eiKOTa, for several reasons:
(1) When Aristotle pairs jieyaq with another concept, it is regularly (as
might be expected) with niKpoc;. In fact he has just done so at 1456bl-2.^
(2) "Probabilities" or "the probable," on the other hand, typically go in
tandem with "necessary consequences" or "necessity," so that eiKOTa would
typically be paired with dvayKaia; cf. 1451a38, Rh. 1357a22-b25, APr.
70a. (3) Aristotle has just remarked, at 1456a34-36, that 6idvoia has an
^ J. Vahlen, Beitrdge zu Aristoteles Poetik (Leipzig 1914) 281.
^ Assumed by I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford 1909) 257 (ad b4). A.
Gudeman, Aristoteles OEPI nOIHTIKHZ (Berlin 1934) 332 (ad loc.) quibbles with Bywater's
wording, but also assumes the tripartition.
^ Though, as we have seen, the authenticity of the phrase there has been questioned.
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especially close connection with rhetoric. Now both pairs, iieYot'^/l^^Kpoq
and EiKOTa/dvaYKaia, have close connections with rhetorical invention:
(a) |iEYa<;/|iiKp6(; embodies the rhetorical motif of size or degree. We
are told at Rhetoric 1403a 17-25 that to ai)^eiv Kai |ieiov)v is npbq to
5ei^ai oti fieya r\ [iiKpov. Furthermore, it is a concern of all three species
of oratory (Rh. 1391b31-92al), though aiS^riOK; is especially suited to
epideictic {Rh. 1368a22-27). Related, though distinct, is the line of
argument known as the xonoq xov [laXXov Kai tittov {Rh. 1358al4,
1397b 12-27).'^ Castelvetro, in his 16th-century commentary on the
Poetics, was to my knowledge the first to suggest the possibility of
repeating the iieyaq/iiiKpoc; pair from bl-2 here at b4. He, however, prints
eiKOTtt in his text. Else (the "gloss" notwithstanding) also perceives the
binary structure of the sentence; but he too prints eiKOTa at b4.
(b) eiKOTa and dvayKaia are the materials for the KpoTotoEK; or
premises of syllogism. We see this treated extensively at Rhetoric 1357a-b,
Prior Analytics 70a-b, Posterior Analytics 74b-75a, and Topics 112b. On
the verbal level this is the way a speaker will reason and offer rationale for
assertions; but at Poetics 1451a36-38 Aristotle has stipulated that in
composing a |i\)0o(;, the author should take care to see that the events of the
story flow one from another KaToc to eiKoq r\ to dvayKaiov. This is crucial
for our understanding of 1456b4, because (as I understand the 5ia{peoi(;
there) it is presented as of fundamental importance that the plot-structure be
organized syllogistically—i.e. in such a way that the audience can make
sense of why one event occurs as the result of another.
I submit, then, that r\ ^eydA^a r\ eiKOTa at b4 is corrupt. But while
either substantive could be replaced to make a dyad that is relevant in a
rhetorical framework, the topic more germane to the discussion of what is
needed ev toic; Tipdyixaoiv is that of rationale in plot-structure—8idvoia
par excellence on the part of the author. Thus it is more likely that Aristotle
originally wrote r\ dvayKaia r\ eiKOTa here.
avei) 5i5aoKaX(aq: 8i6aaKaX,ia is commonly taken as equivalent
to dnoSei^K;, i.e. the giving of information (whether to a dramatic character
or to the audience). D. W. Lucas maintains that it has "nothing to do with
production,"'^ but it may possibly be a technical theater-term referring to
the words of a play-script, the actors' "lines": LSJ s.v. 5i6aoKa?i(a II. 1
'° To aii^Eiv Kai iieioTJv is said at 1403a to be, not a TOKoq, but rather the subject-matter
(itepi a) of a certain kind of enthymeme. The naXA,ov Kai tittov is a general line of argument
used to shape enthymemes, while au^eiv Kai neiouv are applications of particular
enthymemes. They differ further in that aij^rjoK; and lieicoan; are each capable of independent
formulation, while an argument a fortiori consists in the very connection drawn between the
[iaA.?i.ov and tittov. However, Aristotle recognized the kinship of these concepts: at Rh.
1359a23 we find lieyeGoq and liiKpoTtiq mentioned in conjunction with to iiei^ov and to
eA,aTTov. The reader should mark that Aristotle uses the word lonoq in more than one sense;
see G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 100-01.
" Lucas (above, note 1) 196.
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shows that by the time of the epigrammatist Dioscorides, whose floruit was
only a century or so after Aristotle's own, the word could be metonymic for
the plays produced; and even before Aristotle's time, xopo6i5aaKaA,0(; was
the term for the person who taught the chorus their lines. So it is simplest
and clearest to understand avet) SiSaoKa^iaq as = "without dialogue."
The gist of the passage as I understand it, then, is as follows. (1)
6idvoia in drama functions on two levels: in the playwright's mind, as the
work is being composed, and in the characters' minds, as the iivGoq unfolds
onstage. (2) As regards the characters, dramatic dialogue has three ^ept):
(a) proof and refutation, (b) stimulation of the emotions, and (c) degrees of
importance. (3) As regards the playwright, in putting together the events of
the story—ev xoiq Tcpdyixaaiv—8idvoia should be used in the same way
—
anb xcbv aiJTcov i6e(bv 8ei xpf^oGai (sc. xfii Siavoiai)—as when deciding
about dialogue, except that Tipdynaxa must achieve their effect without the
vehicle of language (avev bibaoKaXiaq): "Events, on the one hand (td
|iev), must be perceived independent of verbal explanation, while
argumentation, on the other (td 6e ev xcbi A-oyoai), must (by definition) be
provided orally by the speaker, and must come into being as a result of
speech." Thus (a) the piteous or fearful events themselves elicit pity and
fear from the audience, and (b) the flow of causality in the plot must be
recognizably clear as coming from connections that are either necessary or
probable. '2
Purdue University
'^ The text of this study was completed in February 1993. I am grateful to Professor
Miroslav Marcovich, Professor Neil O'Sullivan, and the late Father William M. A. Grimaldi
for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this essay, and to Professor David Sansone for
his expert editorial help.
